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Abstract
Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that
supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’
past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function
performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment,
we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate
into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not.
Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.
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1 Introduction
People have an inclination for cooperation, but such predisposition is weakened when the
sphere of interaction expands from personal to impersonal as it happens in advanced societies,
where interactions often take place among strangers. These cooperation challenges have led
to the creation of a variety of institutions.1
Our focus is on money, an institution that is ubiquitous across regions, cultures and
historical periods, but whose nature continues to be enigmatic. While theory and empirical
evidence indicate that monetary exchange grants efficiency gains compared to barter or gift-
exchange, the mechanism behind this result remains open to debate. Understanding it can
generate valuable insights into the function and (in)stability of traditional currency systems
and the usefulness of possible digital alternatives (Camera, 2017).
Here we present a laboratory experiment designed to fill these important gaps. Theory
views money as a crude monitoring system—a type of “public memory”—which has no role
to play when individuals can rely on shared knowledge of past conduct. An important
implication of these theories is that money is subordinate to public monitoring systems,
which, if available, would be used to replicate or improve upon monetary trade (Kocherlakota,
1998; Ostroy, 1973; Townsend, 1987). Here we offer an empirical test of this theoretical
concept, using a design that is not tied to any specific monetary model. We find evidence
that money performs a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors. In a set-up
where multiple equilibria coexist, we show that the institution of monetary trade is more
powerful than reputation-based systems in enabling coordination on more efficient outcomes.
1For instance, see Binmore (2011); Bowles and Gintis (2011); Capra et al. (2009); Greif (2006); Kimbrough
et al. (2008); McCabe et al. (1998); North (1991); Ostrom (2010).
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The experiment consists of a cooperative task involving subjects who interact as strangers
for an indefinite number of periods. In each period, subjects meet in pairs, where one has
the option to help the other at a cost. Everyone has repeated opportunities to help and to
receive help because roles alternate over time. Cooperation requires trusting that help given
to a stranger will be returned by a stranger later in the game.
In our Baseline treatment, indefinite repetition gives rise to a social dilemma with two
conflicting elements: opportunism, due to the short-run temptation to avoid helping others,
and coordination, because many cooperation levels – from 0 to 100 percent – are theoretically
feasible. This holds true in all other treatments. In the Money treatment, we add a fixed
supply of intrinsically worthless, abstract tokens that can be exchanged for help, in line with
a monetary trade strategy. In the Memory treatment, we add a record-keeping system
based on numeric balances that rise when help is given, and fall when it is received. This is
designed to capture the operating principle behind the theory in Kocherlakota (1998), i.e.,
there is a technology that allows the public identification of deviations from equilibrium, and
it also allows the replication of the monetary trade strategy. In particular, it ensures the key
requirement that subjects are strangers, who are unable to observe the past conduct for any
of their potential future counterparts.
To identify possible advantages of the institutions we bring to the lab, we create a playing
field that is “theoretically level.” By design, tokens and record-keeping cannot expand the
efficiency frontier as compared to self-enforcing norms alone. Money and Memory allow
help to be based on balances in the pair. In this sense, tokens and record-keeping are
theoretically similar: record-keeping can be used to replicate a pattern of monetary trade
without exchanging tokens, while tokens summarize individual past conduct in lieu of record-
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keeping. Through this design we can uncover if monetary systems affect behavior differently
than systems for collecting and sharing information about past conduct.
The data reveal that institutions like tokens and record-keeping—which do not alter
the efficiency frontier—each significantly boosted long-run cooperation as compared to the
Baseline. Most importantly, we find that long-run cooperation in Money was significantly
higher than in Memory. Tokens encouraged cooperation because subjects took turns at
trading them for help. This alternation did not emerge in Memory, where cooperators
accumulated large numeric balances, thus allowing free-riders to run large deficits. This
suggests that Money facilitates the task of coordinating on credible, incentive-compatible
trade patterns, because tokens are available in limited supply. Hence “liquidity” constraints
could be instrumental to the superior performance of money. Evidence in favor of this
conjecture comes from the Money Unconstrained treatment, where we removed liquidity
constraints, so that—as in Memory—help could always be rewarded with a symbolic object.
Finally, when tokens and a record-keeping system are both available, participants do not
condition help on the opponent’s past conduct, as they do in Memory, but follow a monetary
trade strategy akin the one seen in Money. This evidence comes from the additional
treatment Money+Memory, and reinforces our main result. In sum, our findings indicate
that the addition of systems for collecting and sharing information about past conduct
provided weaker dynamic incentives to cooperate compared to a monetary system.
Previous experiments with repeated social dilemmas indicate that providing information
about opponents’ past actions fosters reciprocity and conditional cooperation (Camera and
Casari, 2009; Ga¨chter and Hermann, 2011; Milinski et al, 2001; Ule et al, 2009). Our results
from Memory are in line with this literature. Notice, however, that the forms of memory
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that are behaviorally most effective include “second order information”, designed to support
the sanctioning of non-punishers (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Ule et al, 2009). Our design does
not provide this information, because it is not relevant in monetary theory. Empirically,
monetary systems are more effective at promoting cooperation and efficiency, even though
they do not include second order information. We show that liquidity constraints are crucial
for this result. With monetary trade, the only way of having a positive balance is to help
someone who has a positive balance. This automatically implies a sanctioning of free riders
(who have zero balance) and also of those who help them (whose balance remains zero).
This double sanctioning mechanism is embedded into monetary trade, but not into our
record-keeping system.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the related
literature. Section 3 describes the design, Section 4 presents the theory, and Section 5
reports the results. Section 6 offers a concluding discussion.
2 Related studies
Our paper contributes to the experimental literature on money and on memory. These two
strands of literature have developed separately.
Laboratory experiments on memory primarily study whether providing information about
past actions of counterparts facilitates cooperation. The typical finding is that this infor-
mation is beneficial to cooperation. Memory is modeled as a “scoring” system, and the
interaction takes the form of a finitely repeated helping game.2 Individuals have a score
2Some studies adopted indefinite horizon games such as prisoners’ dilemmas or trust games to investigate
the connection between knowledge of opponents’ histories and cooperation (e.g., Bohnet and Huck, 2004;
Camera and Casari, 2009). A hybrid design is in Offerman et al (2001), where subjects plays a one-shot,
one-sided giving problem, in a sequence of unknown length.
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consisting of a summary of their recent actions (e.g., Ule et al, 2009), hence the score typ-
ically accounts only for the help given, but not for the help received. In some designs, the
score is enriched with additional “second order” information, suggestive of possible motives
driving uncooperative actions (i.e. distinguishing opportunistic behavior from punishment
of defections, e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Milinski et al, 2001). The form of memory studied in
our experiment does not include this kind of second order information. It also differs in two
additional dimensions: the score of a player accounts for all past periods of play (not only
the recent ones) and for the help received (not only the help given).
A second question tackled by previous experiments on memory concerns how “rich” the
records of past actions must be in order to foster cooperation. An important result is that,
while perfect monitoring of individual behavior easily supports cooperation, anonymous
public monitoring does not (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009). Removing anonymity enables
relational contracting, which is a strong empirical force behind cooperation. By contrast,
our design does not introduce information that allows relational contracting, because our
focus is the study of interactions among strangers.
Our paper also contributes to the small but growing literature that studies fiat monetary
systems in the laboratory. Broadly speaking, there are two strands of this literature: one in
which money must be used in order to maximize efficiency (Deck et al, 2006; Huber, 2014;
Marimon and Sunder, 1993; McCabe, 1989), and another in which money is not needed to
support efficient outcomes, because players can simply rely on a norm of mutual support or,
gift exchange (Camera and Casari, 2014). Results from this second strand of experiments
reveal that fiat monetary systems spontaneously emerge in the laboratory (Camera et al.,
2013; Duffy and Puzzello, 2014), and support the creation of large economies with higher
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efficiency as compared to when monetary exchange cannot take place (Bigoni et al., 2019).
Our work belongs to this second strand of studies, and complements three related pieces of
research on the behavioral importance of monetary systems (Bigoni et al., 2019; Camera and
Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013), where players cannot observe their counterparts’ past
conduct. Instead, here we relax this informational constraint. In two of our treatments we
introduce an information-sharing system that accurately tallies the help given and received
by every player over time. A reputational mechanism can thus emerge. This allows us to
investigate a fundamental question in monetary theory: does money act just as a carrier of
information about past conduct (Kocherlakota, 1998; Ostroy, 1973)?
To understand the contribution of this study relative to our earlier works, we discuss
two issues. First, whether or not a monetary system is theoretically efficient. The designs
in Camera et al. (2013) and Camera and Casari (2014) are tailored to ascertain whether
or not monetary exchange emerges even when it is Pareto-inferior to non-monetary equilib-
rium. Here instead, monetary exchange is by design efficient. Second, how the emergence
and stability of a monetary system depends on the size of the trading group. Camera et
al. (2013) and Bigoni et al. (2019) tackle this problem by considering endogenous versus
exogenous variation in groups size. By contrast, here we work with a fixed group size to hold
informational and coordination frictions constant.
This work is also related to experiments on cooperation in repeated social dilemmas,
which one can classify along three dimensions: the time horizon of interaction, the task
in the stage game, and the matching protocol in the supergame. Our paper studies an
indefinitely repeated social dilemma, which supports a richer set of equilibria compared to
interaction that is one-shot or with a commonly known number of periods (Dal Bo´, 2005;
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Palfrey, 1994). Now consider the task in the stage game. Experiments on indefinitely
repeated games have focused on tasks in which all subjects make a decision in every period,
e.g., prisoners’ dilemmas, voluntary contribution mechanisms, Bertrand duopolies, or trust
games (see Bigoni et al., 2012; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006; Kurzban and Houser, 2005;
Roth and Murnighan, 1978). By contrast, we employ a helping game, in which a dictator
takes a decision while the counterpart remains passive (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). We
use this task because it is simple to understand and focuses participants’ attention on the
intertemporal aspect of the interaction. This task is also at the core of a large class of models
used to study money (see Kocherlakota, 1998).
The third dimension is the matching protocol. Typically, experiments on indefinitely
repeated games involve interactions in fixed pairs (e.g., Blonski et al., 2011; Dal Bo´ and
Fre´chette, 2011). This allows the study of cooperation in small societies, where people know
others’ past behavior. Instead, we consider societies of strangers, where subjects cannot rely
on reciprocity and cannot build reputation. This design is better suited to study cooperation
when interactions are anonymous, as prescribed by the standard monetary model. There
is a related literature on this theme and on institutions that can foster cooperation, such
as personal punishment, information-sharing systems, and communication in environments
with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria (Camera and Casari, 2009; Capra et al., 2009).
3 Experimental design
The experiment has three main treatments: Baseline, Money and Memory (Table 1).
Two additional treatments, Money+Memory and Money Unconstrained, serve as
a robustness check and are discussed in Sections 5.1-5.3. In all treatments subjects face
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a cooperative task that is repeated an indefinite number of periods, where every period
subjects encounter a random counterpart and play in pairs. Interactions are anonymous,
and communication is ruled out. The design in Baseline is described next.
Treatment
Variable Baseline Memory Money Money+ Money
Memory Unconstr.
Group size 8 8 8 8 8
Token supply 0 0 4 4 ≥ 4
Record-keeping No Yes No Yes No
Sessions 4 5 4 4 2
Subjects 96 120 96 96 48
Supergames 20 25 20 20 10
Periods (avg.) 111.5 117.6 116.2 114.0 110.0
Table 1: Sessions and treatments
Notes: Sessions’ dates (dd-mm-yy): Baseline, 6-2-12 (two), 24-1-14, 20-2-12; Money, 7-2-12 (two), 24-
1-14, 16-2-12; Memory, 13-2-12 (two), 21- & 23-1-14, 27-1-14; Money Unconstrained, 12-6-14 (two);
Money+Memory,2-3-18, 5-3-18, 7-3-18, 9-3-18. We run the 2012 sessions at Purdue University (VSEEL
lab) and the 2014 and 2018 sessions at Chapman University (ESI lab). The sessions on 20-2-12, 16-2-12,
27-1-14, and 9-3-18 were run with experienced subjects (=experienced sessions): subjects were informed that
all session participants had previously participated in a session with the same treatment.
3.1 Interaction in a period
Each period players meet in pairs to play a “helping game” (Table 2). In the pair, one player
is a producer, and the other a consumer. The producer has a good, which he can consume
or transfer to the other who values it more (help).
Producer
Y Z
Consumer d− l, d g, 0
Table 2: Payoffs in the stage “game” in Baseline and Memory
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In Baseline the consumer has no action to take (Table 2). The producer chooses either
outcome Z (=Help) or Y (= Do not help). Payoffs to consumer and producer are, respectively,
g and 0 if the producer helps; otherwise, they are d − l and d, with g > 2d − l > 0. In the
experiment d = 6, l = 2, g = 20 and each point is worth $0.03. Surplus in a pair is maximum
when the producer helps, which generates g− (2d− l) = 10 points. We refer to this outcome
as the (socially) efficient outcome or, alternatively, cooperation. The dominant action is not
to help, which we call defection. At the end of the interaction actions and outcome in the
pair are observed by both agents.
3.2 The supergame
A session comprises a sequence of five separate supergames. In a supergame, subjects in-
teract within a fixed group of eight subjects, for an indefinite number of periods. A group
is comprised of four producers and four consumers with deterministically alternating roles.
At the start of every period each consumer meets a producer at random. According to this
matching protocol, there is only a 0.25 probability to be in the same pair in two consecu-
tive periods.3 Participants can never identify their opponent. Hence, subjects interact as
strangers because opponents change at random and are anonymous.
The duration of the supergame is determined by a random continuation rule (Roth and
Murnighan, 1978). A supergame has 20 fixed periods after which the game continues into
an additional period with probability β = 0.75, which we interpret as the discount factor of
a risk-neutral subject. The design guarantees an interaction of finite but uncertain duration;
the expected duration is 23 periods; from period 20, in each period the supergame is expected
3There are 4! ways to match four producers to four consumers; in 3! of such pairings consumer j meets
producer i. In each period one pairing is chosen with equal probability.
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to go on for 3 additional periods. In the experiment a computer randomly selects an integer
number between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution, and the supergame ends when
a number greater that 75 is selected. At the end of each period all participants in the
group observe the number drawn, which informs them about the end or continuation of the
supergame, and can also serve as a public coordination device. Subjects also observe whether
or not outcomes were identical in all four pairs (a binary variable, “yes” or “no;” see the
instructions in Appendix C). This statistic provides a form of anonymous public monitoring,
which is introduced to ensure that the minimum discount factor supporting full cooperation
in sequential equilibrium is constant across treatments (see Section 4).4
Each session involves twenty-four subjects, divided into three groups in each supergame
for a total of fifteen groups per session. Supergames terminate simultaneously for all groups.
As explained in the instructions, each group is constructed so that no two subjects can
interact in more than one supergame.
3.3 Money and Memory treatments
The Money treatment adds indivisible, intrinsically worthless electronic objects called “to-
kens,” which neither yield nor can be redeemed for points or dollars. In period 1 of each
supergame, every consumer is endowed with one token, hence there are four tokens per
group; this supply is known and remains fixed throughout the supergame. Tokens can be
transferred from consumer to producer, one at a time, and can be carried over to the next
period but not to the next supergame. Participants can hold any positive balance of tokens.
4The chosen form of public monitoring may also simplify coordination tasks as compared to other forms,
such as revealing the frequency of actions in the group. A red flag is a signal less open to interpretation than
a frequency-based signal. It is conceivable that outcomes could differ without public monitoring. Camera
and Casari (2009) investigate this issue and find that making outcomes public does not alter cooperation
rates, as compared to the case in which this information is concealed.
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Producer
Y Z Z for 1 Z for 0
give 0 d− l, d g, 0 d− l, d g, 0
Consumer give 1 d− l, d? g, 0? g, 0? d− l, d?
1 for Z d− l, d g, 0? g, 0? d− l, d
1 for Y d− l, d? g, 0 d− l, d? d− l, d?
Table 3: The augmented stage game in Money
Notes: ? denotes the transfer of a token from consumer to producer. In the experiment d = 6, l = 2, g = 20.
The introduction of tokens expands the actions sets relative to Baseline because the
stage game now includes the possibility to trade using a direct mechanism; Table 3 explains
how. A consumer can either keep her tokens (=give 0), transfer one to the producer (=give
1), transfer one conditionally on receiving help (=1 for Z) or on not receiving it (=1 for
Y ). The producer can still help (= Z) or not (= Y ), but now can also choose to help
conditionally on receiving either one (=Z for 1) or no tokens (=Z for 0). Each pair of
choices is associated with a unique outcome, which is reported in Table 3 along with the
relevant payoffs.5 Subjects choose simultaneously and without prior communication, hence,
they cannot signal a desire to cooperate by requesting or offering a token. In particular,
nothing prevents producers from unilaterally providing help, if they wish to do so.6
5The instructions discuss the outcomes for each choice combination. Before starting to play, subjects had to
correctly answer twenty-five multiple-choice questions, including questions about the association between
choices and outcomes.
6There are three main differences with respect to the designs in Camera et al. (2013) and Camera and
Casari (2014): here subjects deterministically alternate between the consumer and producer roles (rather
than randomly), token holdings are unrestricted (rather than bounded), and consumers and producers have
four choices rather than three.
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Several remarks are in order. First, the possibility of conditioning the outcome on the
counterpart’s choice might facilitate coordination on cooperation. The producer can choose
to help conditional upon receiving a token, and the consumer can choose to transfer one token
conditional upon being helped. Helping only in return for a token is a form of monetary
exchange, which can also be achieved by choosing the actions Z and give 1.
Second, to avoid biasing the results in favor of the emergence of monetary exchange the
design includes actions that are antithetical to monetary exchange. By choosing Z for 0,
the producer commits to execute Z only if the consumer chooses give 0. By choosing 1 for
Y , the consumer commits to transfer a token if the producer avoids Z. Hence, tokens may
take on a negative connotation as subjects could use them to tag defectors by giving tokens
to those who do not help. Given this richer action set, the addition of tokens might increase
coordination problems, relative to Baseline.
Third, subjects cannot create or borrow tokens, so a consumer without tokens has no
action to take, as in Baseline. This possibility of being “liquidity constrained” is at the
heart of monetary economics, and also key in our study as it allows us to investigate whether
removing such constraints helps to improve overall efficiency. Subjects are informed whether
a token transfer is feasible in their pair; the design minimizes the chance that this information
might indirectly identify the opponent. Before making a choice, subjects can see if the oppo-
nent’s tokens balance is positive or zero, but not the number of tokens held. The restriction
to transfer one token at a time is not theoretically binding in monetary equilibrium.
Finally, though subjects can hold any number of tokens, a balance of one token per
consumer is all that is needed for the monetary system to function efficiently because with
deterministic alternation of roles there is no precautionary motive to hold tokens (Section
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4). This explains our calibration of the tokens’ supply: with less than four tokens monetary
exchange would be sometimes unfeasible; adding tokens cannot increase the cooperation
frequency, and in fact would undermine it by reducing the endogenous value of tokens.
The Memory treatment retains the Baseline stage game and adds an information-
sharing system, or (public) record-keeping. This treatment is designed to capture the operat-
ing principle behind the theory in Kocherlakota (1998), i.e., there is a technology that allows
public monitoring of deviations from equilibrium, and it also allows the replication of the
monetary trade strategy without exchanging physical objects. In particular, we must ensure
that access to information is limited in the sense that a player “is unable to observe the entries
in the record [i.e., the past conduct] for any of his potential future trading partners.”7 In that
paper, this follows from the assumption of an infinite population, which ensures a very strict
type of informational isolation: agents are complete strangers (as demonstrated in Aliprantis
et al., 2007, Theorem 9). In the experiment, we are constrained to finite populations, hence,
subjects can meet repeatedly within each supergame. Our Memory treatment is designed
to capture with finite populations the stranger’s interaction of the infinite-population model.
In order for subjects to interact as strangers, we should not provide full individual histories;
doing so would undermine anonymity and allow identification of past counterparts. For this
reason, we provide only a summary statistic, which is sufficient to replicate the monetary
strategy. As a result, as in Kocherlakota (1998), players cannot have public information
about every interaction since the beginning of the game.
To do so, in our Memory treatment the information-sharing system assigns to each
7This assumption is in Kocherlakota (1998, p. 239). It implies that although a complete historical record
of players’ past actions exists, there are limitations about what players can see about future opponents, of
which there is an infinite number. In addition, it is assumed impossible for two individuals in a pair to have
had any direct or indirect contact in a past round (p. 236).
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subject a numeric balance (“personal index,” in the instructions), which tallies the help
given and received in the past. The initial balance is 1 for consumers, 0 for producers. As in
Money, balances are intrinsically worthless and subjects only see if the opponent’s balance
is positive or not. The difference with Money is that balances are automatically updated
at the end of each interaction, based only on the producer’s action. If Y is chosen, then
balances in the pair do not change. If Z is chosen, then the producer’s balance increases by
one and the consumer’s falls by one; balances can be negative. If subjects condition their help
on balances in their pair, then Memory simplifies coordination tasks relative to Money
because choice sets are smaller (as in Baseline) and balance updates are automatic. In
this manner, the Memory design ensures that the information about the counterparts’ past
actions is comparable to that available in Money, as the interaction remains anonymous.
An alternative design with precise numeric balances could have the drawback of allowing
identification of past opponents—altering the interaction from impersonal to personal.8
Procedures. We recruited 456 subjects through announcements in undergraduate classes,
at Purdue and Chapman University. The experiment was programmed and conducted with
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were read aloud at the start of the
experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. No eye contact was possible among subjects.
Average earnings were $27.94 per subject (min = $18.84, max = $40.94). On average,
a session lasted 115 periods for a running time of about 82 minutes (min = 57 minutes,
max = 108 minutes excluding instruction reading, a quiz, and payments).
8Neither the personal index nor tokens can improve subjects’ recollection of their own past choices (e.g., the
accounting system in Basu et al., 2009) relative to Baseline, since an electronic record of subjects’ own
past decisions was visible on their screen in all treatments.
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3.4 Design choices: additional considerations
Four features of our design must be discussed in more detail: size of interaction group,
framing of instructions, payoff matrix, and anonymous public monitoring.9 Here we illustrate
how these features were informed by the evidence collected through the companion studies
in Camera and Casari (2014); Camera et al. (2013), and by theoretical considerations.
First, players interact in groups of eight. This could be perceived as being “too small” to
study monetary exchange among strangers. The choice of group size is dictated by practical
constraints and by the need to eliminate reputational spillovers from one supergame to the
next. Working with groups of eight allows us to implement perfect-stranger matching across
cycles, with 24 participants per session, which is in line with the standards adopted in most
economic experiments. Would the pattern of monetary exchange differ, had we implemented
larger groups? Evidence from a previous study suggests this is not so. Camera et al. (2013)
varied the size of economies from 4 to 8, to 32, with a design similar to our Money treatment.
They found that variation in group size neither affected the frequency of monetary exchange,
nor the efficiency levels. In light of this, we do not anticipate that increasing the groups’
size would alter the main message of this paper.
Second, one may wonder whether the subjects’ life experience with money foster cooper-
ation in Money relative to the Memory by facilitating the adoption of a monetary trade
convention. To address this concern, the instructions employ an abstract and neutral lan-
guage, which has no references to money or trade. Participants’ roles are “red” and “blue”
(not “seller” and “buyer”), the possible outcomes are “Y” and “Z” (not “cooperate” and
“defect” or “buy” and “sell”), and tokens are called “tickets” (not “coins” or “francs”) and
9We thank anonymous Reviewers for raising these issues.
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cannot “be redeemed for dollars.” As a further check, subjects are given the option to engage
in actions that are antithetical to monetary exchange (see Table 3).
In fact, participant’s familiarity with money outside the lab is unlikely to be responsible
for the experimental results about tokens. Short of running an experiment in small-scale
primitive societies, support for this claim may come from comparing inexperienced subjects’
behavior across treatments, at the inception of the game. If familiarity with real-world
money is what drives subjects’ choices, then monetary equilibrium should easily emerge
and immediately prevail over alternative outcomes. This implies that efficiency in the first
supergame should be higher when tokens are present than when they are not. Instead, in
previous studies the opposite pattern emerges (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al.,
2013): subjects “discovered” monetary exchange in the experiment. As we will see, the same
happens in this experiment: the exchange of tokens is very limited at the beginning, and
becomes widespread only following considerable experience within the laboratory.
Third, we adopt a matrix with asymmetric payoffs. It is well known that payoff varia-
tions may alter behavior (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2018). For example, the payoff asymmetry
between producers and consumers may affect choices due to fairness considerations (Fehr
and Ga¨chter, 2000). Results from previous experiments do not support this hypothesis: the
emergence of monetary exchange is robust to manipulating the payoff matrix so that de-
fection payoffs are symmetric or the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is different (Bigoni
et al., 2019; Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). The emergence of monetary
exchange is also robust to increasing the imbalance of cumulative payoffs, which emerge
when consumer/producer roles alternate randomly rather than deterministically, as in this
paper. More importantly, one may worry that in Memory and Money accumulation of
17
high balances may attract envy. This is precisely the reason why in our design cumulative
earnings and balances are unobservable and nearly impossible to infer, as individuals are
strangers whose histories remain private throughout the experiment. This design feature
minimizes the potential impact of fairness considerations.
Fourth, our design includes anonymous public monitoring of defections. This gives the
best shot at memory to outperform money. To see why this is so, consider the operating
principle behind the theory in Kocherlakota (1998). There, the efficient outcome is supported
using the following two-state informational structure. If there is a deviation, then every
individual is unmistakably identified either as (a) deserving of a reward (cooperation) or
(b) deserving of punishment (defection). State (b), if reached, is absorbing. State (b)
characterizes the initial deviator, as well as anyone who has knowledge of the presence of a
deviator (independent of whether they have always cooperated or not). State (a) comprises
everyone else who does not fit into state (b). In this context, memory is a technology
that plays two roles: (i) it allows such an identification of individuals as either being in
state (a) or (b); and (ii) it allows the replication of the monetary trade strategy. With
this technology, one can construct the following punishment: someone who deviates from
full cooperation will be permanently punished immediately after his deviation. The same
punishment is applied to all those who have knowledge of a deviation. As a consequence, all
those who have defected, or have knowledge of a defection, will never receive a reward in the
continuation game (this is called autarchy in the original paper). It is this grim punishment
which theoretically deters the deviation from happening in the first place. Given this, the
most powerful and simplest “memory technology” is one in which knowledge of a defection is
immediately shared with everyone in the group, which is precisely what we do in our set-up.
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4 Theoretical considerations
We start by showing that a social norm of cooperation supports full cooperation as an
equilibrium in all treatments. Proofs and mathematical details of this section are reported
in Appendix A. Consider the following strategy:
Definition 1 (Cooperative strategy). As a producer, the player cooperates (selects Z)
as long as she has not observed a defection (Y). If a defection is observed, then the player
defects forever after.
Common adoption of this strategy gives rise to a social norm, which consists of a rule of
cooperation and a rule of punishment that sanctions any publicly observed uncooperative
action with full defection. The norm exploits the availability of anonymous public monitor-
ing, and is constructed so that after any history of play, conduct in the continuation game is
part of some equilibrium of the original game (Abreu et al., 1990), either full cooperation or
full defection. Hence, the game has a simple recursive structure as in the public observabil-
ity case studied in Kandori (1992). If players are sufficiently patient, then the punishment
threat can adequately deter any defection, and full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If β ≥ β∗ := d
g − d+ l , then the strategy in Definition 1 supports full
cooperation in equilibrium.
The threshold value β∗ is the cost-benefit ratio of cooperating: the producer’s cost from
helping is divided by the consumer’s surplus from being helped. The condition β ≥ β∗
is sufficient and necessary for existence of cooperative equilibrium but does not guarantee
that it will be realized instead of another outcome with lower efficiency. In fact, thanks
to public monitoring of defections, multiple equilibria exist ranging from full defection to
full cooperation. Full defection is always an equilibrium because it consists of an infinite
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repetition of the static Nash equilibrium strategy (Y ). Full cooperation is socially efficient
because it maximizes surplus in all meetings.
In Appendix A we prove that full cooperation is an equilibrium by checking two condi-
tions. First, in equilibrium, no producer should prefer to defect. Second, given that everyone
else follows the candidate strategy in Definition 1, no producer should prefer to cooperate
off-equilibrium. The latter condition is immediately verified: any equilibrium defection is
publicly observed, hence, everyone defects forever after and there is a loss from cooperating.
The first condition requires checking that a producer cannot improve her payoff by moving
off equilibrium (unimprovability criterion). The design parameters yield β∗ = 0.375, so un-
der reasonable assumptions about subjects’ risk attitudes cooperation is an equilibrium in
every treatment as the continuation probability from period 20 on is 0.75.
It is important to note that we have derived conditions sufficient for the existence of the
efficient equilibrium using the public trigger which is available in our design. The natural
question is what would happen if anonymous public monitoring were not available. The
analysis in Camera and Casari (2014, online appendix) deals precisely with that case. The
upshot of that analysis is that, with private monitoring, we would obtain a threshold lower
bound discount factor above β∗ because a deviation could not immediately trigger a perma-
nent state of full defection. This delay in punishment would raise the payoff from moving
off the equilibrium path.10
10Punishment under private monitoring takes the form of a contagious process of defections, which spreads
through the economy via the random matching process. Camera and Gioffre´ (2014) provides a general
characterization of this process, with and without tokens.
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4.1 Equilibrium with tokens
Adding tokens adds actions and expands strategy sets but does not expand the set of equilib-
rium payoffs because the efficient outcome is an equilibrium without tokens. In fact, adding
tokens does not eliminate any of the equilibria possible in Baseline as players can always
adopt strategies that ignore tokens (which have no intrinsic value). Tokens can be used to
support the efficient outcome. Following monetary theory, below we consider a strategy that
conditions cooperation on the transfer of a token, letting H (=positive) and L (=zero) denote
the observable balances in a pair.
Definition 2 (Monetary trade strategy). In any period and after any history: a con-
sumer with balance L has no action to take, and a consumer with balance H transfers one
token upon receiving help. A producer with balance L helps upon receiving a token, and a
producer with balance H does not help.
If everyone adopts this strategy, then tokens are exchanged quid-pro-quo for help, and
become a medium of exchange. This outcome is called monetary trade. In equilibrium all
encounters are trade meetings in which the consumer “buys” help by giving her only token to
the producer who has no tokens, as in a Turnpike model (Townsend, 1980). The monetary
trade strategy is cognitively simple: it is history-independent and does not require any change
in behavior as a reaction to a defection. Off-equilibrium a producer may have tokens or a
consumer may have none, in which case tokens are not exchanged and help is not given.
Because the theory tacitly assumes that agents coordinate on the best available equilibrium,
tokens are irrelevant.11 Consumption patterns in monetary equilibrium mirror those under
the social norm—so payoffs coincide with v0 for a producer and v1 for a consumer—and the
efficient outcome is supported on the same parameter set of the social norm.
11In monetary theory, tokens are said to be theoretically relevant (or, essential) only if monetary trade
expands the set of equilibrium payoffs (see Kocherlakota, 1998, p. 232).
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Proposition 2. If β ≥ β∗, then monetary trade supports full cooperation as an equilibrium.
In monetary equilibrium a producer who refuses to help is “punished” by not receiving
a token. The player will not be able to consume next period, much as it happens under the
social norm, albeit for different reasons. This explains why the lower bound β∗ is the same
as under the social norm.
4.2 Equilibrium with record-keeping
Adding record-keeping leaves unaltered the action sets compared to Baseline. It enriches
the strategy sets because producers can now condition actions on observed balances, denoted
L (0 or below) and H (1 or above). This eliminates none of the equilibria that are possible
in Baseline because players can always adopt strategies that ignore balances. Yet, there
are ways in which balances can be employed to support full cooperation. In particular,
subjects can replicate the monetary trade strategy without the need to exchange symbolic
objects. Hence, equilibrium outcomes exist in which the balances L and H convey the same
information about past actions as under monetary exchange.12
Definition 3 (Trade strategy). In any period and after any history, the player takes an
action only as a producer. If her balance is L, then she helps only consumers with balance
H. In all other circumstances, she does not help.
This strategy supports full cooperation because, as in Definition 2, help is conditioned on
balances in the pair. Producers help only to increase their balance above zero, and do so only
if the consumer’s balance is H. It follows that the trade strategy supports full cooperation
when β ≥ β∗. Hence, record-keeping does not expand the set of equilibrium payoffs.
12Off-equilibrium, information about past actions might differ across treatments. For instance, in Money
a consumer with balance L might have helped without receiving a token, while in Memory producers
who help always increase their balance. The balances neither allow identification of past opponents, nor
support reputation-based strategies. Even if other ways exist to use record-keeping to support efficient
play, these different strategies cannot improve equilibrium payoffs over the trade strategy.
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However, there are two differences between using the trade strategy in Money and in
Memory, which may alter behavior in ways that are not predicted by the theory. First, the
record-keeping system may simplify coordination on efficient play as only producers make
choices and balances are automatically updated. Instead, in a monetary system, producer
and consumer must coordinate on trading a token for help. Second, producers should not
help consumers with balance L, but the incentives to do so may differ across treatments.
They are strong under monetary trade because a producer’s balance cannot increase by
helping a consumer without tokens. This is not so in Memory: helping always increases the
producer’s balance. Hence, producers may be tempted to help someone with balance L, when
in fact they should punish. That is to say, trade is a best response in and off-equilibrium
in Money—due to the presence of liquidity constraints—but it may not be a best response
off-equilibrium in Memory because consumers are liquidity unconstrained. In section 5.3
we will develop a theoretical model that incorporates these considerations to shed light on
some of the empirical findings that are listed in the following section.
5 Results
We report a series of results that address the following questions: if defections are public,
is full cooperation easy to sustain? When monetary trade is possible, do subjects attain
different cooperation rates than when it is not? Does a system designed to maintain and
share information about past conduct supersede the function performed by money?
All analyses consider only the first twenty periods in each supergame and take as unit
of observation, unless otherwise noted, the average choice of each subject in a supergame.
Results 1-5 and 7 rely on sessions run with inexperienced subjects, while Result 6 explicitly
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addresses the issue of experience.
Result 1. In the long-run, cooperation and efficiency were greater in Money and Memory
compared to Baseline.
Figure 1: Relative frequency of cooperation by treatment
Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1 and Tables 4-5. By design, aggregate
efficiency is proportional to average cooperation. The minimum and maximum cooperation
rates observed in a supergame are 10% and 85% in Baseline, 23% and 95% in Money, 19%
and 100% in Memory (inexperienced subjects only). Average cooperation rates in Baseline
range from 59% in the first supergame to 47% in the last supergame. This declining trend
is statistically significant at the 5% level as illustrated by the panel regression in Table 4,
model 1. The dependent variable is the average cooperation frequency of a subject in a
supergame; the regression controls for individual characteristics.
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
Individual rate (Baseline) (All treatments)
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Supergame -0.031** 0.016 -0.031** 0.013
Money -0.266*** 0.069
Money × Supergame 0.106*** 0.018
Memory -0.102 0.063
Memory × Supergame 0.045*** 0.016
Constant 0.308** 0.127 0.438*** 0.103
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 360 (72) 1200 (240)
R-squared within 0.064 0.126
R-squared between 0.259 0.212
R-squared overall 0.179 0.172
Table 4: Cooperation rate.
Notes: One obs. per subject per supergame. Inexperienced sessions, all supergames. Panel regression
with random effects at the individual level and robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the
session level. The estimated coefficients for Money and Memory are significantly different (p- value< 0.001).
The estimated coefficients for Money × Supergame and Memory × Supergame are significantly different
(p- value< 0.001). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Memory × Supergame is weakly significant
(p-value = 0.099). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Money × Supergame is significant (p-value
< 0.001). In this and all subsequent regressions, Controls include the following individual characteristics:
gender, major, two measures of understanding of the instructions (response time and number of wrong
answers in the quiz) and session location (Purdue, Chapman).
Now consider Money and Memory. In the last supergame, average cooperation are
72% and 60%, respectively. The differences in cooperation with Baseline are statistically
significant according to a linear regression (1% and 5% level, respectively; Table 5). Contrary
to Baseline, in Money there is a significant positive trend with experience (Table 4, model
2). The Memory treatment exhibits a weaker positive trend (significant at a 10% level).
One may be tempted to chalk up Result 1 as an artefact of subjects being in the habit
of relying on record keeping and monetary exchange in everyday life. Yet, two observations
suggest this result has a deeper connotation. First, neither Money nor Memory expand the
efficiency frontier—the efficient outcome is attainable in Baseline—nor constrains subjects
25
to adopt a trade strategy, nor precludes cooperation through a social norm. In fact, adding
tokens and balances expands action set, strategy sets, and the equilibrium set relative to
Baseline. Hence, if anything, the enriched stage games in Money and Memory should
increase coordination difficulties, not reduce them (Capra et al., 2009; Weber, 2006).13
Dependent variable: Supergame 1 Supergame 5
Individual frequency
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Money -0.151* 0.069 0.307*** 0.078
Memory -0.059 0.065 0.132** 0.047
Constant 0.342* 0.155 0.456*** 0.069
Controls Yes Yes
N 240 240
R-squared 0.212 0.207
Table 5: Treatment Effects on Cooperation in Supergames 1 & 5.
Notes: One observation per subject. Inexperienced sessions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the session level. In supergame 1 the estimated coefficients for Money and Memory are significantly
different (p-value: 0.002). In supergame 5 the estimated coefficients for Money and Memory are significantly
different (p-value: 0.014).
Second, Money and Memory supported lower overall cooperation than Baseline in
supergame 1 (Table 5). This inferior short-run performance suggests that pre-existing “mon-
etary habits” are not the primary reason for the experimental results. In fact, it suggests
that subjects developed a monetary trade convention over the course of the session, with the
intent to coordinate on a cooperative outcome.
Result 2. In the long-run Money supported higher cooperation and efficiency than Mem-
ory.
Figure 1 and Tables 4-5 provide support. In the last supergame the average cooperation
level in Money is significantly different from Memory (Table 5).
13The result is not an artifact of having anonymous public monitoring. In an experiment with a similar design
but private monitoring, Camera and Casari (2014) report that monetary trade emerges and promotes
cooperation.
26
In the experiment, tokens became a fiat money in a manner consistent with monetary
equilibrium. Tokens were by design intrinsically worthless, and—unlike the transfer of bal-
ances in Memory—their exchange was not forced. This finding about the endogenous
emergence of monetary systems is in line with earlier studies (Camera and Casari, 2014;
Camera et al., 2013). An original feature of this study is that tokens could be used in a
way opposite to monetary trade. Consumers could transfer a token only to a producer who
refused to help (Section 3), but this behavior was not observed. When token exchange was
feasible, many producers offered help only in exchange for a token (63%) and consumers
offered a token only in exchange for help (82%). When consumers had no tokens, producers
refused to help 72% of the times.
One cannot exclude that the behavior in Memory is consistent with some inefficient
equilibrium being played. Indeed, the design admits multiple equilibria, with frequencies of
cooperation ranging from 0 to 100 percent. What we do observe is that efficiency is lower in
Memory than in Money even if subjects could adopt the trade strategy – which supports
efficient play – equally easily in both treatments. A possible explanation for Result 2 is that
subjects did not exploit record-keeping to replicate a monetary trade pattern.
Result 3. Money supported trade but Memory did not.
Support for Result 3 comes from Figures 2-3 and Table 6. Full cooperation in Money and
Memory can be achieved through the trade strategy. This means that after any history, in
either treatment producers with low balances (=L) help only consumers with high balances
(=H). If everyone adopts this strategy, subjects alternate between giving and receiving help,
so would have 0 balances as producers and 1 as consumers (Figure 2, left panel).
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Figure 2: Distribution of balances in Money and Memory
In the experiment, the distribution of balances approximates the 50/50 theoretical dis-
tribution only in Money, where about 56% of subjects hold 0 tokens and 38% hold 1 token
(Figure 2, center panel). This distributional pattern completely breaks down in Memory,
where only 16% of subjects have a 0 balance and 23% have balances 1 (Figure 2, right
panel). This is direct evidence that subjects did not adopt a trade strategy, nor a strategy
compatible with efficient play.14
To study deviations from the trade strategy we look at the empirical distribution of
balances. In equilibrium, trade requires help to be given in every encounter. Instead, off-
equilibrium help should be given only when the producer has balance L and the consumer
has H; otherwise, help should not be given, especially if the consumer has balance L.
14By design, efficient play is identical in Baseline and in Memory, as the action sets in these treatments
are identical. These two treatments differ only in the existence of balances. But balances in Memory
change automatically, so in the efficient equilibrium all producers have 0 balances, and all consumers 1
balances, exactly as in Money if they exchanged balances back and forth.
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Figure 3: Trade emerges in Money but not in Memory.
Figure 3 shows the empirical frequency of cooperation when help should and should not
be given under the trade strategy (solid vs. dashed line). Theoretically, the solid line should
be at 100%, and the dashed line at 0%, if everyone followed the trade strategy. In Money,
the aggregate cooperation frequency is consistent with the widespread adoption of the trade
strategy: the distance between the solid vs. dashed line in Figure 3 (left panel) amounts to
49 percentage points in the last supergame. By contrast, in Memory the two lines tend to
overlap even in the last supergame (Figure 3, right panel).
The data reveal that subjects do not use record-keeping in the same manner they use to-
kens. Producers do help more frequently consumers with balance H rather than L. However,
in Memory producers do not condition their help on their own balance as they should, if
they followed a trade strategy, while in Money they do, helping more frequently if their
balance is L rather than H.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of balances in a pair on the probability of observing
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cooperation in the pair, in the two treatments. If subjects adopt the trade strategy in each
treatment, then the probability of observing cooperation should be higher in trade meetings—
where the producer’s balance is L and the consumer’s is H—than in all other meetings. The
data from the Money treatment are in line with this prediction: help is given with a
significantly higher frequency in trade meetings than in all others (Table 6, p-value < 0.001
for all comparisons). However, this is not so in Memory, where the estimated marginal
effect of being in a trade meeting is significantly smaller than the estimated marginal effect
when both producer and consumer have balance H (p-value = 0.003). In addition, the
estimated marginal effect of being in a trade meeting is much smaller in Memory than in
Money (p-value < 0.001 in a regression with pooled data from both treatments). This is
evidence that the trade strategy is used in Money but not in Memory.
Dependent variable: Money Memory
Cooperation
outcome in a pair Estimate S. E. Estimate S. E.
Supergame 0.099*** 0.016 0.138*** 0.029
Period -0.002*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.002
Balance: Producer, Consumer
L, H 0.440*** 0.035 0.095*** 0.016
H, L -0.118** 0.055 -0.006 0.032
H, H 0.203*** 0.063 0.191*** 0.024
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 3600 (72) 4800 (96)
Table 6: How balances in a meeting affect cooperation.
Notes: One observation per subject per period. Inexperienced sessions. Marginal effects from a logit
regression. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level.
Result 3 is especially remarkable given that trade in Memory requires less coordination
than in Money, where consumer and producer must mutually agree to a trade. This is
not so in Memory, as only the producer takes an action, while balances are automatically
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updated. So, why did trade emerge in Money and not in Memory?
Result 4. Money removed the incentives to free ride but Memory did not.
Support for Result 4 comes from Figure 4, which shows that the introduction of Money
and Memory altered the distribution of earnings because it redistributed surplus from
frequent defectors to frequent cooperators.
In each supergame, we classified subjects into five categories according to their frequency
of cooperation as producers (horizontal axis) and computed the associated average earnings
across all periods, regardless of their role, consumer or producer (vertical axis). The share
of observations in each bin is reported by the corresponding marker. In Baseline, about
39% of subjects are frequent cooperators and 28% are frequent defectors; those who earned
the most on average are the frequent defectors (circles).
Introducing the record keeping technology lowered the incentives to defect relative to co-
operation. The association between income and cooperation remains U-shaped and frequent
defectors still earn the most (squares). By contrast, the use of tokens as money generates a
dramatic shift in incentives: average individual earnings and cooperation frequency exhibit
a positive, monotone association (diamonds). Frequent defectors are now the category that
earned the least, and account for only 8% of the subject population. This result confirms
the findings reported in Camera and Casari (2014). In short, a monetary system endoge-
nously emerged in the Money treatment and the use of money removed the incentives to
free ride. In contrast, in the Memory treatment subjects failed to remove incentives to
free-ride, which is a likely reason why efficiency is lower in Memory than in Money.
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Figure 4: Cooperation frequency versus profits
5.1 Combining Money and Memory
To further check the robustness of our results, it is helpful to consider a situation in which
both money and memory are simultaneously available.15 In the Money+Memory treat-
ment, subjects have access to two possible trading instruments: one is tokens – which are in
scarce supply – and the other is numeric balances – as in the Memory treatment. Theoret-
ically the use of memory should supersede the use of money, i.e. in this treatment tokens
should not be used. Moreover, if a behavioral complementarity exists between the two in-
stitutions, then cooperation rates could be even higher relative to a situation where each
institution is present in isolation.
Result 5. In Money+Memory monetary trade emerged; cooperation and efficiency were
lower than in Money.
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this additional treatment.
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The data reveal that subjects coordinate on using tokens as a trading instrument, and
do not exploit the additional information provided by the record-keeping system. When the
consumer had tokens, help was exchanged for a token in 67% of the encounters, which is not
far from the 71% observed in Money.
Figure 5: Cooperation when tokens and record keeping are both available.
Figure 5 reveal that producers did not take into account the consumer’s record-keeping
balance. In Money+Memory, when the consumer had no tokens, help was given in 20%
of the encounters, which is even below the 26% observed in Money; again, the Figure
confirms that the consumer’s record did not play a role in the producer’s decision to help.
This is evidence that, given the choice between two institutions, money and memory, subjects
coordinated on using money as a trading instrument.
Cooperation rates are systematically below the Money treatment, even if subjects had
access to a richer information set about the actions of the counterparts. This difference is
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amplified, rather than reduced, as subjects gain experience across supergames. In cycle 5, the
overall cooperation frequency was 62%, which is in between Memory (60%) and Money
(72%). Figure B.5 and Table B.5 (in Appendix B) provide additional evidence. These
results suggest that a coordination issue emerged when subjects faced the choice between
two alternative institutions, and provide no support in favor of the hypothesis that these
institutions can complement each other.
5.2 The effect of experience
Figure 1 suggests that experience with the task affects cooperation. The open question is
whether Memory can outperform Money in cooperation frequency if subjects have gained
enough experience. All of the results above are based on the behavior of subjects that had
no previous experience with the game. Now, we present evidence based on sessions run with
subjects who had participated in an earlier experiment under the same treatment.
Result 6. Data from experienced subjects confirm and reinforce Results 1-5.
By the last supergame of the experienced sessions, cooperation in Baseline fell to 28.8%,
in Money rose to 94.6%, and in Memory reached 55.4%. These levels are significantly dif-
ferent one from another according to a probit regression (see Appendix B.1). This finding
reinforces Results 1-2. Experience with the task also helps to firmly establish the use of
the trade strategy in Money but not in Memory, which strengthens the finding for inex-
perienced subjects (Result 3). Consider the distance between the solid and dashed lines in
a graph made with data from experienced sessions and similar to Figure 3; by the last su-
pergame, we have a distance of 85 percentage points in Money and of 8 points in Memory
(see Appendix B.1). Experience also wiped out free riding behavior in Money, in line with
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Result 4 for inexperienced subjects. About 89% of subjects were frequent cooperators and
no one cooperate in less than 40% of the encounters.
In Money+Memory, cooperation rates are in between those in Money and in Mem-
ory (85.8% in supergame 5). The difference with Memory is statistically significant at
the 1% level, while the difference with Money is not (see Table B.4 in Appendix B). This
confirms Result 5.
5.3 How liquidity constraints affect incentives
By design, the information available in Memory allows to replicate the trade strategy in
Money without having to exchange tokens. Empirically, we observe that subjects did not
use that strategy. How can we explain this result? In Money the general use of the
trading strategy removes the incentive to free-ride because a producer who exits a meeting
without a token necessarily becomes a “liquidity constrained” consumer in the next round.
Hence, refusing to help is unprofitable because producers do not help liquidity constrained
consumers (see Figure 4, Money treatment). Removing liquidity constraints, as done in
Memory, raises the incentive to free-ride relative to Money because free-riders can always
“pay” by accumulating negative balances.
We provide a simple theoretical framework to formalize this idea. Consider the indefi-
nitely repeated helping game when there are two types of players, rational and behavioral, in
proportion 1− p and p, respectively. At the beginning of the game, rational players choose
between two strategies—free-riding and monetary trade—selecting the one with the highest
long-run payoff. A free rider never helps, while a monetary trader helps only if her balance
is L and the consumer’s is H. Behavioral players, instead, follow a fixed rule of thumb, which
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does not necessarily maximize an objective function. As consumers, they offer a token in
exchange for help, whenever possible. As producers, they behave either as altruists, who
cooperate unconditionally because of pro-social preferences, or as quid-pro-quo players, who
cooperate only if doing so raises their balances. Unlike rational traders, quid-pro-quo players
help any consumer who can “pay” with a unit of balances—even those with balance L.
The presence of behavioral players raises the incentive to free-ride. The free-riding payoff
is below the payoff from choosing the trading strategy if
β ≥ d(1− p)(g − d+ l) ⇒ β ≥
β∗
1− p.
It follows that the larger is the share of behavioral types p, the higher is the critical β
needed to support a trading equilibrium. With our parameters, the above inequality holds
only if behavioral players represent less than half of the population. The formal proof is in
Appendix A. Notice that in Money the share p includes only altruists because quid-pro-quo
players never help consumers with balance L (they have nothing to offer). This is the reason
why the incentives to trade are higher in Money than in Memory.
The empirical implication of this theory is that removing liquidity constraints in Money
should impair cooperation and reduce trade, similarly to what happens in Memory. To
test this conjecture, we designed the new treatment Money Unconstrained, where a
consumer who wants to trade but has no token, can freely create one. Hence, trade is always
feasible and balances can go negative as in Memory.
Result 7. In Money Unconstrained monetary trade did not emerge; cooperation and
efficiency were lower than in Memory.
Figures B.5, B.6 and Table B.5 (in Appendix B) offer evidence. In Money Uncon-
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strained, tokens are exchanged in 59% of encounters, but these exchanges do not map
into the monetary trade strategy. We find a weak tendency to help more frequently con-
sumers who have tokens, but we also see that producers do not condition help on their own
balance—in contrast with monetary trade. This behavior is in line with what we observed
in Memory (see Table B.6, Appendix B), but contrasts with what we see in Money, where
producers without tokens cooperated more frequently than those with tokens (Table 6).
To refine this aggregate view, we now estimate the share of subjects who fit the description
of behavioral types. For each subject we ran a one-sided binomial test considering the choices
as producer in the entire session. The null hypothesis is that the probability to help a
consumer with balance L is ≥ 0.75. We classify the subject as behavioral if we cannot reject
the null with α = 0.05. The unit of observation is a subject in a session, i.e., we assume
that the type is constant across cycles. This estimate relies on the assumption that each
encounter between the subject and a consumer L is an independent trial.
We first consider Money, where only altruists help consumers with balance L. Here, 22%
of subjects fit this description. We then look at the Memory and Money Unconstrained
treatments, to estimate the share of behavioral types, which we expect to be higher as it now
includes also the quid-pro-quo players. In Money Unconstrained 33% of subjects are
classified as behavioral, and this share increases to 45% in Memory. In line with our simple
behavioral model, the incentives to trade as opposed to free riding are higher in Money,
where quid-pro-quo types do not help free-riders.
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6 Conclusion
We have offered an empirical test of a long-standing theoretical assertion: money is just an
imperfect substitute for knowledge of past conduct (Kocherlakota, 1998; Ostroy, 1973; Os-
troy and Starr, 1990; Townsend, 1987). This assertion is typically taken to imply that there
should be no benefit from using money in societies where past actions are made public. In
an experiment, we compared the role performed by money as opposed to an institution that
reveals past conduct in the group (memory). Our setup is designed to test the principle of
operation behind the theoretical assertion that money has no role to play when past conduct
is observable, and not to test a specific monetary model. This is done by constructing lab-
oratory economies where payoff maximization requires the exchange of intertemporal gifts,
but participants can neither rely on reciprocity nor relational contracting. The methodolog-
ical advantage of experimental over field evidence lies in the ability to decouple institutions
that are often intertwined (e.g., money and credit). By selectively adding and removing an
institution we can establish causal links between that institution and economic performance.
The experimental evidence provided reinforces the long-held view that monetary systems
are key to support impersonal exchange, intertemporal trade and, consequently, large-scale
cooperation. At the same time, our study highlights original aspects of the institution
of money that have been ignored or poorly understood. It suggests that well-functioning
monetary systems are not simply rudimentary arrangements for monitoring past conduct,
but play a role that is richer than previously thought. The study demonstrates that the use
of money imposes a punishment discipline among strangers, which is unattainable otherwise.
Our study makes three contributions to the monetary literature. First, previous research
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has documented that monetary systems affect behavior and outcomes in repeated social
dilemmas (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). However, no study had yet
provided an empirical test of the theoretical assertion that the role of money in a society
is simply to reveal past conduct (Kocherlakota, 1998). To test the operating principle be-
hind this assertion, we constructed economies in which strangers—who by design cannot
engage in relational contracting—can derive significant benefits from cooperating over the
long haul. We find that the suggested theoretical parallel between money and memory does
not empirically translate into a functional equality. Remarkable differences emerge between
the Money and Memory treatments in terms of long-run efficiency, strategies employed,
and distribution of earnings. This demonstrates that the behavior observed when a mone-
tary system is in place is not comparable to the one observed when the same conduct can
be sustained by relying on a public memory. Our test represents a unique contribution to
monetary economics and also to the experimental literature on money. Of course, one could
imagine other forms of record keeping, which could be tested to address different research
questions. The form we adopted captures the essential features of the “memory” discussed
in the theory of money: it must allow a replication of monetary trade without exchanging
physical objects, it must allow public observability of deviations form efficient play, while
not revealing the past conduct of any future counterpart.
Second, we offer a theoretical rationale for our findings: monetary systems affect the
structure of incentives more effectively than memory-based systems. The Baseline treat-
ment shows that groups of strangers struggle to coordinate on collective punishment schemes
possibly due to heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences, coordination frictions, cognitive or
emotional factors. The addition of a record-keeping system in Memory solves these prob-
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lems only in part, by providing individual-specific information on past conduct (Result 1).
Subjects can identify individuals as being free-riders based on their balances—unlike in
Baseline—but still do not consistently sanction them (Result 4). The exchange of tokens
in Money overcomes this shortcoming (Result 3) because punishment is directly built into
the monetary trading system: liquidity constraints make monetary trade self-enforcing. A
producer has an incentive to help for a token—to have a means of payment in the future—and
has nothing to gain from helping free-riders, who have nothing to offer in exchange. Sup-
port for this interpretation comes from comparing Money to Money Unconstrained,
where consumers can always “pay” by creating one token if they have none. Here, coop-
eration would be self-enforcing if no one helped consumers without tokens, but there is a
weak incentive to do so because producers who help always “get paid.” This lack of punish-
ment generates a negative externality for the entire group, magnifying the incentive to free
ride, thus displacing cooperation (Result 7). As a result—although illiquidity is typically a
source of inefficiency—relaxing liquidity constraints in the experiment (as we do in Memory
and Money Unconstrained) lowered long-run efficiency. In a way, liquidity constraints
impose a much-needed discipline on sanctioning free riders, which more effectively aligns
incentives with cooperative behavior.
A third contribution is to provide a robustness check for previous experiments about
social norms and the endogenous emergence of monetary systems (Camerer et al., 2016).
This paper replicates findings about the Baseline and Money treatments from earlier
experiments with a similar design, but different conditions in terms of length of interaction,
subject pool, payoffs asymmetry, role alternation, and instructions.
These findings sharpen our understanding of how different types of legal, economic, and
40
social institutions affect the structure of incentives for cooperation in societies of strangers.
The simple and theoretically appealing record-keeping system we introduced turned out to
be empirically unsuitable to sustain efficient play. By contrast, out of some barren and the-
oretically inessential tokens, a rudimentary monetary system emerged that greatly boosted
cooperation and efficiency.
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